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EFFICIENCY OF MARKETS UNDER MORAL HAZARD WITH SIDE-TRADING
This paper examines the efficiency of decentralized activity in market
equilibrium under incentive constraints. We focus on insurance markets with
moral hazard, under varying assumptions regarding the structure of information
available to agents trading with one another. In particular, we examine
contexts where, in addition to the unobservabi 1 i ty of effort levels, trades
between an insurer and insured are not observable to other insurance firms.
Such contexts generate "incentive externalities," owing to the
unenforceability of exclusive contracts involving limited insurance. We
contrast this with contexts where trades and/or effort are publicly
observable
.
For each informational setting, we derive the corresponding notion of
constrained- e f fie iency , by considering the problem of a social planner endowed
with comparable amounts of information as private agents in the market
setting. Decentralized activity in the market is represented by a general
contracting game, with outcomes defined by a solution concept which allows
coalitions of agents to coordinate their actions, subject to constraints
imposed by information available about effort and trades. For each
informational setting, we discover a close correspondence between
market outcomes and the corresponding notion of constrained efficiency. In
this sense, therefore, incentive externalities do not cause market outcomes
to be constrained inefficient. However, they do imply a welfare gain from
public observability of trades.
EFFICIENCY OF MARKETS UNDER MORAL HAZARD WITH SIDE-TRADING
INTRODUCTION
A prime question in welfare economics is the extent to which agents,
although acting in a decentralized manner, can nevertheless achieve outcomes
that are socially desirable. This paper investigates this question for
economies with imperfect information -- specifically, in the context of
markets with moral hazard. Such markets typically involve significant
externalities between different firms that may potentially transact with a
given customer. These externalities stem from the public good character of the
customer's effort: the effect of varying the amount of trade offered by one
firm affects the customer's effort, and thereby also the profits of other
firms transacting with the same customer. This creates the need for exclusive
contracts, where each customer trades with a single firm, and where the amount
of trade is limited in order to generate requisite effort incentives. Such
restrictions, however, create an incentive for customers to circumvent them,
by engaging in additional trades with other firms. Exclusive contracts cannot
be enforced if side-trades between the customer and other ^irT.r car.r.cr u =
prevented. In such contexts, exchange is constrained not only bv tr.e
unobservability of effort, but also oy tne possibility ot side- trades with
other firms.
This problem is not limited to insurance markets: the externalities from
side-trades are likely to pose difficulties whenever hidden information or
hidden actions are present In credit markets, different lenders exert
externalities upon each other, as the lending policies of one affect the
probability that others will be repaid, by affecting the incentives of
borrowers with respect to effort and project selection (Kle tzer ( 198^ ) ; see
also Bizer and DeMarzo (1990) and Lacker and Weinberg (1990)). The design of
managerial compensation schemes is complicated by the ability of managers to
purchase stock, options and trade in futures markets on the side. Dynamic
incentive schemes are also constrained if agents can borrow and lend (Rogerson
(1985), Fudenberg, Holmstrom and Milgrom (1990)). In agrarian economies, the
externality associated with moral hazard has been argued to constitute an
important reason for the interlinking of credit and tenancy contracts
(Braverman and Stiglitz (1982)). Similar externalities are exhibited in
macroeconomic models based on labor contracts with imperfect information
(Grossman, Hart and Maskin (1985), and Kahn and Mookherjee (1988)) and in
centrally planned economies with black markets.
Previous literature, has, however, exhibited considerable disagreement
regarding the implications of "incentive externalities" for the efficiency of
decentralized market outcomes. On the one hand, papers by Pauly (1974),
Helpman and Laffont (1975), Arnott and Stiglitz (1986) and Greenwald and
Stiglitz (1986) -- as well as some of the papers cited above -- argue that
with unobservable side-trades market outcomes are constrained- inef fie ient
:
specifically, there exist the scope for governmental tax-subsidy schemes to
effect Pareto improvements In contrast is the approach of Prescctt ar.d
Townsend (1984), which extends the Arrow-Debreu theory of competitive
equilibrium to moral hazard contexts. with an alternative notion of
commodities and agents, viz. where consumers purchase (at given prices) units
of (randomized) individually incentive compatible contracts over
consumption- effort pairs, they succeed in extending the classical existence
and welfare theorems of competitive equilibrium
.
This disagreement motivates the following three basic questions: (i) What
is the relevant model for competitive behavior in markets with moral hazard?
(ii) What is the appropriate benchmark of efficiency for evaluating market
outcomes? (iii) How do market outcomes perform according to the appropriate
notion of efficiency? The purpose of this paper is to develop a framework that
addresses these questions. This framework wiLl enable us to understand better
the basis for arguments for the efficiency or otherwise of competitive markets
with imperfect information. For the sake of analytical simplicity, we apply
this framework to an example of an insurance economy with multiple potential
insurance firms.
(i) Whac is che relevant model for compec ic Lve behav lor In markers with
moral hazard? The model we propose makes explicit the underlying assumptions
regarding the structure of information, and the nature of trading and
contracting processes. We study a Shubik-style trading game between firms and
customers, under three alternative informational scenarios In the first,
effort levels, as well as all trades between every pair of agents are publicly
observable. Consequently, a firm and a consumer can write contracts
conditioned on the latter's effort, as well as on trades executed with other
firms. In the second scenario, effort levels are unobservab le , while trades
continue to be observable. In this context, exclusive contracts can still be
enforced, and are subject only to constraints imposed by the unobservab i 1 i ty
of effort levels. Finally, in the third scenario neither eff.-r" r.cr
are observable: here transactions are constrained bv the :ncer." :'-'es
consumers to choose appropriate effort levels, as well as to trade with other
firms
.
The structure of observability of effort and trades defines the kinds of
commitments that agents can enter into, and thereby the nature of contracts
that can be enforced. We place no restrictions on the set of agents that can
enter into a contract, thereby allowing the formation of arbitrary
coalitions. These coalitions can coordinate their trading actions, subject to
constraints imposed by opportunistic behavior of members with respect to
variables chat, arc publicly unobservable In the chird informational scenario
described above, for instance, a coaLition of firms and consumers is
constrained both by the unobservabi 1 i ty of effort leveLs of consumers, as well
as of their trades with different firms, both inside and outside the
coalition. The ability of coalitions to form in order to "internalize
externalities" is thus endogenously restricted in this fashion.
We argue that a natural solution concept for a game of multilateral
contracting is an incentive constrained version of Aumann's Strong
Equilibrium, i.e. , where no coalition of agents should have an incentive to
deviate with an incentive compatible contract between themselves. An important
issue is the appropriate formulation of these incentive constraints. In order
to capture the unobservabil ity of side- trades, we impose (in addition to
individual incentive constraints) the restriction that a deviating contract
not be vulnerable to a further coordinated deviation by a pair of agents which
is individually incentive compatible. The resulting solution concept is
labelled Pairvise Incentive Compatible Strong Equilibrium (PICSE).
(ii) What is the appropriate benchmark of eff ic iency for evaluating
market outcomes? The relevant efficiency criterion is typically represented
bv solutions tc !:he oroblem faced bv a hvpotheticai social planner who seeks
to directly mandate actions of different economic agents in order to promote
their welfares. The natural benchmark is to consider a social planner subject
to exactly the same informational constraints that agents on the private
market are subject to. We therefore consider the planning problem under three
parallel informational scenarios. In the first-best context, the planner can
observe effort levels as well as trades between every pair of agents, and can
mandate levels of these variables throughout the economy In the second-best
scenario, all trades are observable, but efforts are not. And our new
"third-best" context is one where the planner can verify neither trades nor
efforts In the latter two contexts, the planner must issue instructions that
are consistent with the incentives of agents to abide by them Second-best
allocations are thus constrained by the incentives of individual consumers to
choose appropriate effort levels, while third-best allocations must
incorporate additional coalition incentive compatibility constraints, relating
to trades with private firms. The unobservabi 1 i ty of trades typically
generates a welfare loss, by requiring the provision of insurance to be
restricted further than required by the need to provide effort incentives
alone. A more detailed analysis of the third-best problem is provided in a
related paper (Kahn-Mookherj ee( 1990a) )
.
(iii) How do market outcomes perform according co the appropr late notion
of eff iciency? For each of the three informational structures, we compare
PICSE outcomes of the market game with solutions to the corresponding
planner's problem. In the first-best and second-best scenarios, PICSE exist
and there is an exact correspondence between PICSE outcomes and the set of
constrained efficient outcomes. In the third-best context, we establish the
existence of PICSE, as well as the Second Welfare Theorem: i.e.
,
every
third-best allocation can be achieved as the outcome of a PICSE, subsequent to
initial lump-sum redistributions (We have also prcvec a _ irr.i cer. ."f-rs ior.
the First Welfare Theorem: specifically, ail PICSE outcomes in which the
aggregate profit of firms is not too large, are third-best.)
Since for every informational context there exist constrained-efficient
equilibria of the market game, our results appear to be at odds with those
analyses that argue that competitive equilibria are necessarily
constrained- inefficient . The reason is that such analyses employ a different
notion of constrained-efficiency. Specifically, any assertion of inefficiency
based on demonstrating the scope of tax/subsidy schemes to generate Pareto
improvements, implicitly assumes that the planner has the ability to monitor
trades In the absence of such monitoring, these tax/subsidy schemes cannot be
implemented. Thus, arguments of this genre for the failure of a market with
unobservabLe trades and effort implicitly use a second-best, rather than
third-best efficiency standard. On the other hand, such arguments can be
alternatively interpreted as a statement of the welfare gains from public
monitoring of trades, an activity that some may argue is the natural province
of governments.
The Prescot t -Townsend approach, on the other hand, corresponds to a world
where all trades are observable. This is implicit in their assumption that
contracts defined over consumpt ion-effort pairs (subject to effort incentive
constraints alone) are enforceable. In other words, exclusive contracts are
feasible, and there is no loss of generality in assuming that all consumers
trade with a single centralized agency. Their demonstration of equivalence
between competitive equilibria and efficient outcomes is mirrored in our model
by the equivalence between PICSE outcomes and efficient outcomes in the
second-best world.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the basic
model of insurance with moral hazard. Section 3 describes solutions to the
planning problem under different informational r.szr iLr.z? "-;:: :
describes the general nature of the market game and zhe solution conr-:-
employed. Section 5 applies this to the insurance setting, and presents our
main results concerning the relation between market and efficient outcomes
II THE MODEL
A single risk-averse consumer wishes to purchase insurance from one or
2
more risk neutral insurance companies. There are two states of nature:
accident and no accident, and a single consumption good. An accident causes
the consumer's endowment of this good to be reduced by d units. By expending a
uti lity -diminishing amount of effort the consumer can reduce the likelihood of
an accident. The consumer's expected utility is described by:
W(x.e) - u(x
Q )
(l-p(e)) + u(x - d) (p(e))
where x is a vector (x x ) of net trades of state contingent consumption, and
u is a continuously dif ferentiable , strictly concave, and strictly increasing
function. Take state to represent the no-accident state. The probability p
of an accident can be affected by the consumer's choice of a
utility -decreas ing effort denoted by the variable e. We assume that e can take
on two values: e € (0,1), and that
1 > p(0) > p(l) > 0.
Each insurer is risk neutral. If the consumer purchases policy
(x^
,
x ) from insurer l, and expends effort e, then the expected payoff to
insurer i is
V(x\ e) = - x
Q
l (l-p(e)) - x^ p(e) .
There are a countable number of insurers. The total insurance received by the
consumer is the sum of net trades accepted from firms he trades with:
x - S. x'
provided the sum converges The effort level e is a public good, in the sense
that all insurers' expected payoffs are affected by the level of e chosen by
the consumer
.
Let X be the set of fu 1 1 insurance consumption levels i.e.
,
X = ( (x x
L
) | x Q
= x
x
- d
Let Z(e) be the set of zero profit policies conditional on the choice by
the consumer of effort level e. That is,
Z(e) = { x 1 | VCx
1
,
e) =
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE
In Figure 1, net trades in the two states x
n
and x are plotted on the
axes. The origin represents the no-trade point. The straight lines Z(l) and
Z(0) represent the trades at which firms would exactly break-even on
aggregate, assuming that the effort level chosen is 1 and respectivelv The
upward sloping line x
n
= x
1
- d represents the full insurance points The>
dotted curved lines represent indifference curves of the consumer, assuming
that the effort chosen is e = 1; the solid curved lines represent indifference
curves corresponding to e - . The latter set of curves have a flatter slope,
owing to the likelihood of an accident being lower with higher effort. For any
given effort level, the indifference curves are tangent to the corresponding
breakeven line along points of full insurance.
III. EFFICIENCY CRITERIA: THE SOCIAL PLANNING PROBLEM
Consider the problem of a social planner choosing an a 1 locat ion for this
economy. An allocation specifies trades (x x ) between every firm i and the
consumer, as well as an effort level e for the consumer. In the world where
all trades as well as the consumer's effort are observable by the planner, the
planner can choose any allocation whatsoever. Since we are interested in
Pareto efficient allocations, we assume that the planner's objective is to
maximize the welfare of the consumer, subject to the constraint that firms
attain a predetermined aggregate expected profit n . Then in the first -best
outcome
. the planner chooses any allocation with the property that x, the
consumer's net trade, solves
maximize W(x,e) subject to V(x,e) > -n (i)
x , e
In the second-best situation, trades are observable, but the consumer's
effort choice is not. Hence the planner is constrained to allocations
((x ),e) satisfying the additional incentive constraint:
e
€ argmax U'(x.e) (ii)
e€(0, 1}
In other words, once x is chosen, we cannot rely on the consumer to pick the
efficient e to go along with it. Instead we must assume he will behave
opportunistically. The optimal choice of x must be constrained by that
opportunistic behavior. In general, for full or over-full insurance the
consumer prefers low effort. When insurance is such that the payoff in the
no-accident case is much greater than the payoff in the case of an accident,
Che consumer is induced to exert effort. Wo assume that in the absence of any
trade the consumer prefers to choose e = 1, that is:
[u(0) - u(-d)
]
[p(l) - p(0) J > 1. (1)
In Figure 1, the curve B represents the boundary between the region in which
the consumer prefers e = 1 and the region in which the consumer prefers e = 0.
We can therefore describe the consumer's preferences for pairs (x„, x ) in
terras of the "reduced form" utility function
Y(x) - max (W(x,l) , W(x.O))
The heavily shaded line in the diagram represents one reduced form
indifference curve.
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE
Figure 2 describes the set of trades that enable firms to break even,
after incorporating the effect of that trade on the consumer's optimal effort
choice. This is depicted by the heavy broken line, which coincides with Z(l)
to the right of B, and with Z(0) to the left of B. Points to the southwest
give positive profits in aggregate, tat seconc oest insurance pu^L.
corresponding to -n = is the utility maximizing point on the boundarv ~o:
strictly risk averse consumers, the point will either be F, full insurance
with zero effort, or S, less than full insurance with positive effort At the
latter solution, the consumer is restricted in the amount of insurance
provided, to the minimal extent necessary to induce him to choose the high
level of effort. The interesting case is the one where the second-best
outcome for n = is S.
Now consider what is likely to happen if the consumer can obtain
additional insurance on the side from private firms, and the planner is
powerLess to prevent such s ide - t rades . Once the consumer has accepted the
trade S, he will prefer to find an additional firm from whom to purchase
additional, insurance. Given the additional insurance, the consumer will
choose to reduce effort Nonetheless, the additonal insurer will be able to
offer an insurance policy that makes a profit even assuming e = 0, and the
consumer finds this additional purchase desirable. They are not preferable
(for the planner) to the second-best allocation, because in fact they make it
no Longer actuarially fair for the initial firm to supply S: given the
reduction in effort, the initial firm will sustain a loss. Thus, the second
best outcome may no longer be feasible if trades are unobservable
.
If the planner also cannot monitor trades between the consumer and
insurance firms, feasible allocations must incorporate the incentives of the
consumer to enter into an unmonitored side-trade with some firms. A precise
statement of the corresponding coalitional incentive compatibility constraint
requires us to formulate the set of side-trades that third party firms will be
willing to enter into. Such a set will certainly include any trade that is
profitable irrespective of the consumer's effort choice. We will call
these "safe side- trades " The set of safe side-trades is the cone
* E K~i V(r,i) > and V(r.O) > 0!
which is represented by the shaded area in Figure 2. Hence, a necessary
condition for an allocation to be immune to an unmonitored side- trade is that
(x,e), the aggregate consumption and effort of the consumer, satisfy the
following coalitional constraint:
(0,e) G argmax W(x+r, e) (iii)
reT,ee(0, 1
)
If this constr.ii.nt were not satisfied, some insurance firm could offer an
additional trade which would be profitable and which would also make the
consumer better off However it is not clear that this condition is
sufficient to rule out all side-trades, since (iii) considers only side-trades
which make nonnegative profits ir respec t ive of the consumer ' s effort cho ice
.
It is conceivable that there exists a side-trade r and an associated effort
level e which maximizes W(x+r,e), such that
W(x+r,e) > W(x,e) and V(r,e) >
and yet (x,e) satisfies constraint (iii). In words, an insurance firm may
offer t to the consumer, knowing that it will make positive profits as long as
the consumer chooses his effort e optimally given the modified consumption
x+r . For the economy we examine, it turns out that (iii) is also suf f ic ient
to ensure that chosen allocations are immune to unmonitored side- trades. In
other words, the planner's optimum given constraints (i) - (iii) turns out to
have the property that no pair of agents has any incentive to make any
self -enforc ing side-trades.
We thus define the third-best planning problem to be
Maximize W(x,e)
x , e
subject to
V(x,e) > n ( i)
and (O.e)
€
argmax W(x+t
,
e)
.
(iii)
reT.ee (0,1)
Note that constraint (iii) implies constraint (ii) above. We will call a
o
solution to this problem a third-best outcome. The following properties of
Chird best outcomes are established in Kahn and Mookherjee (1990b)
Propos i t ion 1
:
Given any preassigned level of profits *
,
a third best outcome
exists. Any such third best outcome (x~, x ) satisfies:
*
n
+ * <
x + n >
x
Q >
x - d.
INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE
Thus, in particular, the set of third best outcomes lies within a bounded
set. Subsequent to an initial redistribution to ensure attainment of the
profit target jt
,
a third best outcome does not give negative insurance and
does not give more than full insurance. Such an outcome (for 7T = 0) is
depicted in Figure 3. Let the point P be the maximum point on or below the
actuarially fair locus Z(l) such that the reduced form indifference curve
through P lies entirely above the half-line extended from P parallel to Z(0)
.
If this point is north-west of the origin, then it is the third best outcome.
It can be shown that a third-best outcome is either point F of the previous
diagram (full insurance with zero effort;, or it is an outcome involving high
effort and strictly less insurance than is required to provide effort
incentives (i.e., it lies to the right of the curve B) . It is possible in a
third-best outcome for firms to make expected profits greater than the
pre-assigned level n ; figure U gives an example where despite n = , they end
....
9
up earning positive profits.
INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE
Our proposed coalitional constraint should be contrasted with a
requirement that all agents have identical marginal rates of
1
-\
substitution, sometimes calLed a no - ret rade constraint . For our problem, tin
no-retrade constraint is a requirement that
x € X = ( (x x ) | x -x -d|
That is to say, the no-retrade constraint would require that the consumer have
full insurance, for only in this case would the marginal rate of substitution
between income in the two states be identical for consumer and insurers. The
no-retrade constraint has the same flavor as our third-best requirement, and
has sometimes been employed as a restriction on contracts. (See, for example
Hammond (1987) for an analysis of this sort in a competitive environment
without moral hazard). In the context at hand, the no-retrade constraint is an
unsatisfactory formulation. Its plausibility is dependent on implicit,
unstated assumptions about reactions of agents and it treats old and new
insurers asymmetrically. For this constraint to make sense, new insurers must
ignore the potential for the new insurance to alter the effort of the
consumer, while old insurers take into account the incentive effects of any
insurance they offer. In the diagrams the no-retrade constraint would always
Dick out the full - insurance
,
zero-effcr*" ^cir.t F
IV MARKET OUTCOMES
The Contract ing Game
In this section we formulate a contracting game that describes the
process by which individual agents deal with one another in economies with
private actions. We begin by describing the formulation in the insurance
setting described above; at the end we briefly give a formal definition of a
contracting game applicable to general economies with private actions.
In the insurance setting, the game will be played by many insurance firms
and a single consumer. The consumer can potentially trade with multiple
firms. It can enter agreements with firms individually or write a common
contract with a conglomerate of firms. We define the notion of a contract
more precisely below.
We visualize a two step procedure. In the second step, agents are
engaged in a Shubik type trading process, where firms make offers of trades
and the consumer makes requests to trade. If the request to a firm matches an
offer by the firm the corresponding trade occurs; otherwise no trade occurs
with that firm. The consumer also chooses the level of effort. Let x denote
the trade between the consumer and firm i and x = Z.x : then the Davoffs for
1
the consumer and firm i are respectively W(x,e) and V(x ,e).
Formally, we assume a countable infinity of firms, i = 1,2, . . . Firm i
offers the set S C R The consumer requests r
,
i = 1,2, . . . and chooses
effort e. Trade occurs if r e S We restrict the consumer to make a finite
number of non-zero requests. This is our way of maintaining the free entry
aspect of the model: it means there is always an unlimited number of inactive
firms ready to make additional trades. N denotes the set of agents
(0,1,2,...), where agent is the consumer.
Prior to the trading stage there is a communication/contracting stage.
1 S
Here different agents may attempt to coordinate their second-stage trading
activities. If some of their second - stage activities are publicLy observabLe,
they may write contracts binding themselves to certain behavior. We assume
these contracts over pubLicly observed variables are perfectly enforced by an
outside agency.
The informat ion structure for the economy indicates which second-stage
actions are publicly observable. We deal with three different scenarios. In
the ful 1
-
informat ion world, the enforcement agency can distinguish all
second-stage actions; under moral hazard with observable trades, contract
enforcers can observe all trade offers and requests, but not the effort chosen
by the consumer. Finally if there is moral hazard and trades are
unmonitorable , then contract enforcers can observe no actions whatsoever and
first-period contracts do not bind agents at all. Formally, if A. is agent
i's set of second-stage actions, then the information structure defines a
partition ©. of A. , whose cells d . are publicly observable.
We now describe a contrac t more precisely. It is (1) a listing of the
parties to the contract I C N and (2) an enforceable commitment for each i S I
-- that is, a specification of a cell 9. in 8. for each i. For a contract c,ii
we let I[c] denote the parties to the contract and 9.{c\ the commitment by
player i in the contract. As the information structure changes, so does the
In the first stage of the game, agents write contracts to coordinate
their trades in the following way: Each agent i proposes a contract c. . A
contract c is executed if all parties to c unanimously propose contract c,
i.e. if c. = c for all i 6 I[c]. Agent i is bound to the commitment 9.{c]
only if c is executed; otherwise he is bound to no commitment at all. Hence,
as a function of first round contract proposals c -
^
c
n-
c
i
c o> • • ' agent i
is constrained to choose a second-staee action from the set
16
(0 . [ c . ] if c. Ls executed1 l
A. otherwise
1
Thus a strategy for an agent in this two stage game consists of a
contract proposal at the first stage plus a plan for second-stage actions g.
.
This plan is a function of all contract proposals and must be consistent with
the agent's commitments, if any, i.e.
g
L
(c) S F^c).
For this game we will consider three information structures:
In the first-best information structure all actions by all agents are part of
the information structure. In the second- best information structure, all
offers to trade are part of the information structure, but the effort level e
is not. In the third-best information structure, no action is part of the
information structure; thus the first stage of the game is redundant.
We conclude this section by describing the procedure for making any
non-cooperative game into the second-step of a two-step contracting game.
Take any non cooperative game F defined bv strategy sets A for i E N, and
payoffs
ieN
Take an information structure for this game. Let £ be the set of all
feasible contracts given the information structure; and let £ denote the set
of contracts to which i is a party. Then the contracting game F is defined as
follows: For each individual i in the set of players N, the strategy set is
17
D l = { (c.
. g. ) | c € G
1
and & (c) e F. (c) for all c G )( 5* )
ieN
Given a strategy vector
(c.g) e)[ B1
ieN
player i's payoff is W.(g(c)).
Solution Concept
A strictly non-cooperative formulation of T would be unsatisfactory,
because there would always be Nash equilibria where no contracts are signed
and no trade takes place. (If all agents but one propose null contracts and
non-participative trading strategies the final agent has no incentive to take
any action either). Such equilibria appear unreasonable: if there are gains
from trade or from writing contracts, we expect parties to coordinate their
actions at the contracting and trading stages. For example, if the
no-contract, no-trade equilibrium is in vogue, and we are in the full
information world, a firm and a consumer have a mutual incentive to jointly
propose a contract where thev commit to exchanging first-best insurance while
the consumer commits to first-best effort This contract is enforceable under
full ir.f crsarior. . Neither firm nor consumer could lose oy proposing it, since
if the other party fails to propose it, no one is bound by the commitment.
Coordinated strategies in T seem natural provided such coordinated
arrangements are (1) to mutual advantage and (2) enforceable. There are two
ways that the arrangements can be enforceable: the publicly verifiable
aspects can be turned into commitments which are publicly enforced; the
unverifiable aspects must be credibly self -enforcing . For example, in a world
where effort is unverifiable, a firm and consumer might try to write a
18
contract In which they commit to a trade which is profitable tor the firm only
if the consumer chooses high effort. Since the effort must be se 1 f - enforc ing
,
the firm will only be willing to enter into such a contract if it were then in
the consumer's own interest to choose high effort.
A natural way of modeling the formation of such arrangements is to
formulate a notion of a credible deviation and then look for outcomes
immune to credible deviations. That is what we proceed to do:
A coal ition C is a non-empty subset of N. An agreement is a pair (a,C)
where C is a coalition and a is a strategy vector in T. An agreement has the
following interpretation: Taking as given the actions of those outside C,
members of C propose to play actions (a.). _. We will say that agreement
(a,C) blocks strategy vector b if
(1) a. - b. for i « C
l l
(2) a is weakly preferred to b by all i in C, and strictly preferred by
some i in C.
Then a natural requirement for strategy vector a to be a solution
exhausting all possible gains from trade is that there be no agreement /K rx
which blocks a. If so, a is a Strong Equilibrium (SE) in the sense of Aumanr.
(In contrast, a Nash equilibrium is a strategy vector wnicn is blocked by no
single-person agreement).
From our perspective, the difficulty with the SE is the credibility of
the blocking agreement. For a strategy vector to be SE it must be immune to
any unilateral deviations and to any joint deviation. In most situations, no
SE exists; in particular as we will see, whenever individual incentive
constraints bite there cannot be a SE.
It is more natural to restrict potential blocking agreements to a set of
"credible" agreements. We will define credibility of a deviation in terms of
other agreements which block the deviation. We say that agreement (a,C)
blocks agreement (b,D) if the agreement (a,C) blocks the strategy vector b and
D is a subset of C. In other words, a blocking agreement is a coordinated
deviation by a subset of members of the initial agreement which Pareto
dominates the original strategy for the deviating group.
A minimal requirement for a credible deviating agreement (b,C) is that
every member of C have an incentive to stick with b. Given an arbitrary
agreement (b,C) some member of C may prefer to deviate from the stipulated
action, and this may jeopardize the welfare of other members of the coalition.
In other words, we will want to require that blocking agreements be
individually incentive compatible.
We call the agreement (b,C) individual iy incentive compatible ( I IC) if no
individual in C has an incentive to deviate from his action in b, given all
other players' actions. If (a,N) is IIC, then no player has an incentive to
deviate from a - - in other words, a is a Nash equilibrium. If we take IIC to
be the criterion for a credible multiplayer agreement, then we can use it to
generate the corresponding equilibrium notion:
Strategy vector a is an Individually Incentive Compatible Strong.
Equil ibnum ( I ICSE ) if
1) (a,N) is IIC
2) There does not exist an IIC agreement (b.S) which blocks a.
Note that every SE is an I ICSE. The notion of IICSE is a natural
solution concept for games in which individual incentive compatibility is a
problem. In particular it is the analogue in non-cooperative settings of the
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Incentive Compatible Core. But as we will see, it is inadequate for
?n
analysing games with s i de - t rad ing , in which joint incentive problems arise.
The difficulty is that IICSE does not go far enough in requiring deviations to
be credible. An IICSE must be immune to all I I C joint deviations. The
deviations themselves don't have to be immune to further joint deviations,
only to individual deviations. In the case of insurance with unmoni torable
trading, a joint deviation by insurance companies and the consumer may block
a proposed allocation, but this deviation may be vulnerable to a further
side-trade between some firm and the consumer. In a third best world, it is
highly unlikely that a IICSE will exist, since any proposed allocation has to
be immune to side- trading and also to alternatives which are themselves
vulnerable to side - trading
.
These consderations motivate the introduction of a further restriction
on credible deviations and an associated equilibrium concept, the Pairwise
Incentive Compatible Strong Equilibrium:
Definition : Agreement (b,S) is Pairwise Incentive Compatible (PIC) if 1)
(b,S) is IIC and 2) provided S has more than two members, there does not exist
an IIC two-player agreement which blocks (b,S).
Note therefore that every IIC one- or :vn-p;aver agreement is PIC.
Definition: a is a Pairwise Incentive Compatible Strong Equilibrium ( PICSE) if
(1) (a,N) is PIC.
(2) There does not exist any PIC agreement (b,S) which blocks a.
It should be readily apparent that this is the natural generalization of
IICSE. The substantive difference is the requirement that joint deviations be
immune to further deviations by pairs from the deviating coalition.
Propos i t ion
:
If strategy vector a is IICSE, then it is PICSE.
Proof
:
By condition 2) of IICSE, a is not blocked by any two-player IIC
agreement. Combined with condition 1) this demonstrates that a is PIC. If
there is no IIC agreement which blocks a (condition 2 again) there is no PIC
agreement which blocks a.
Note that if a is not IIC then it is not PIC; if a is not PIC, then a is
not PICSE, ICSE or SE. Thus all of these equilibria are refinements of Nash
equilibrium. We can continue iteratively, defining Trio-wise Incentive
Compatibility, Quad-wise Incentive Compatibility and so forth. The definition
of N-Wise Incentive Compatible Strong Equilibrium would turn out to be
essentially the Coalition Proof Nash Equilibrium of Bernheim Peleg and
Whinston.
Nonetheless, for the problem at hand, we do not need to go to the
complete formulation; we get identical results to CPNE by sticking with the
easier notion of PICSE. The reason we can stop with PICSE is that
all benefits of c ide - trading car. be achieved within two-player coalitions
v. APPLICATION TO THE INSURANCE MARKET
First - and Second- Best Economies
We now use these equilibrium concepts to analyse the insurance market
game in the various informational contexts we have described.
Propos i tion 2 : In the full information world, SE outcomes, IICSE outcomes
and PICSE outcomes are identical, and coincide with the first best outcomes.
Proof
:
Clearly an allocation which gives negative profit to any firm is not
individually incentive compatible: That firm would block by refusing to
trade. Thus such an allocation cannot be PICSE, ISCE or SE.
Consider any outcome giving less than first best utility. By assumpt ion
,
there exists a passive firm earning zero profits. Form the coalition of
consumer and firm, where they exchange the first best exclusive contract. (In
other words, the firm and the consumer specify that the firm will offer the
first best level of insurance, the consumer will request the first best level
of insurance and engage in the first best level of effort and request zero
insurance from any other firm. Since all these actions are contractable , the
contract, if consummated, completely restricts second-stage actions. If the
contract is not consummated, second-stage actions are immaterial, assume both
parties engage in zero trade in that event.) Since this two-agent blocking
agreement is individually incentive compatible, the initial allocation could
not have been PIC, therefore it cannot be PICSE, ICSE or SE.
In an allocation which gives the consumer first best utility, firms earn
zero profits, so an allocation with positive profits must give a consumer less
than first best utility. From the above argument such ar. allocation czr.r.c- h?
PICSE. We conclude that in every PICSE, all firms receive zero profits anc
the consumer receives first best utility.
It remains simply to show that SE exist, and yield the first best
outcome, for then the SE must be PICSE and ICSE as well. We claim the
following is an SE. Firm 1 offers the first best exclusive contract to the
consumer who request the same. The consumer offers first best effort and no
contract with any other firm. The associated second-step actions are as
described above. All other firms offer nothing and do not trade in the second
step. Suppose there exists a block (b,S). The outcome must Pareto dominate
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Che first best outcome, a contradiction
Propos i t ion 3: If effort is unobservable but trades are observable, the IICSE
outcomes and the PICSE outcomes are identical, and coincide with the second
best outcomes
.
Proof : Analogous to the above.
Note that if the incentive constraint in the second best problem bites,
there is no SE in a second-best world.
The Third- Best Economy
Finally we turn to an examination of the third-best world. The analysis
requires the set of agreements to be complete in a particular sense. By
ensuring that player O's strategy space is complete we avoids paradoxes that
arise when a player has a continuum of desirable deviations but no "best"
deviation. The modification we describe below to complete the set is a
special case of the general procedure described in Kahn-Mookher j ee (1991).
We complete the space of agreements bv extending the strategies available
to player to include all "limits," (that is to say, all sequences) of
strategies in its initial strategy space. Let A* be the set of strategy
vectors in which player is allowed to play a limit strategy. We define
payoff for any element of A* to be the limit of the infimum along the sequence
for player 0, and to be the infimum for any other player. Let *J* be the set
of agreements with this extended strategy space. The definitions of IICSE and
PICSE now take agreements to be in the set d* . The theorems of the previous
section are unaffected by using this extended set of agreements (although some
proofs become more complicated).
Propos i t ion U: When neither trades nor effort is observable, a PICSE outcome
(x
,
e ) sat isf ies
(i) W(x,e) > max
,
W(0.e'
)
e
(ii) V(x V ,e) > for all i
(iii) W(x,e) > max
,
W(x,e')
e
(iv) W(x,e) < W
sb
where W is the insured's expected utility in the second-best outcome.
SB
Proof
:
If any of (i) - (iii) are not satisfied, then there exists a singleton
deviation which blocks. If it is not IIC, it cannot be an equilibrium
.
(iv): use (ii) and (iii) to conclude (x,e) is feasible in the Second Best
problem
.
Propos ition 5
:
Any PICSE outcome (x,e) is feasible in the third-best problem
with zero profits.
Proof : From proposition 2, V(x,e) > 0. Suppose the other condition of third
best feasibility does not hold -- i e there exists r <E T 2nd e' c t
W(x+r,e') > W(x.e). Consider che roiiowing two-agent agreement: A passive
firm j offers r, the consume!, cnoost:^ e , requests r rrom tnat passive firm
and x from all the others. If this is IIC we are done. If not then the
consumer must find it profitable to deviate. Suppose he has an
optimal deviation. Then that optimal deviation plus the offer of r by
the passive insurance company forms a two player IIC agreement which
blocks, a contradiction. If there is no best deviation for the
consumer, then any sequence of deviations the utility of which approaches the
supremum serves as the consumer's strategy in the two-player IIC agreement
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and t_he same conclusion follows.
Propos i t ion 6: Every third best outcome can be achieved as a PICSE with lump
sura redistribution.
Proof
:
Start with the case where in the third best outcome aggregate profits
are equal to 0. If profits in the outcome are greater than zero, redistribute
those profits and repeat the argument.
Consider the following strategies: Player 1 offers the third best
contract, players j = 2,3. . . offer the safe cone, the consumer requests the
third best contract from 1, nothing from the other players, and chooses the
third best level of effort.
First we show that there is no coalition which blocks the strategy and
gives firm 1 non-negative profits. For if there were, the outcome would
Pareto dominate, and therefore must violate the third-best constraint. Since
the coalition excludes some firm the purchase of r is available. So the
blocking coalition is not IIC.
Next we show that there is no coalition which blocks the strategy and
gives firm 1 losses To give firm 1 losses means that the consumer continues
to buy the third best level x* from him and switches from a third best effort
of 1 lo a deviating effort of 0. If the new total purchase x induces effort
and x - x* makes non negative profits at an effort level of zero, then x - x*
makes non negative profits at an effort level of one as well. Thus the total
purchase from the other firms is an element of the safe cone, a contradiction.
From the above we conclude that the strategy vector 1) is PIC and 2) is
not blocked by any PIC agreement. Finally, by the previous theorem, any
outcome which Pareto dominates the third best problem does not satisfy these
two conditions. Thus this strategy vector is a PICSE.
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The final theorem shows chat no stronger equi I ibr iuni notion will work in
this problem as long as the third best constraint is binding:
Propos i t ion 7
:
When neither trades nor effort are observable, there exists no
IICSE if the third-best outcome is Pareto dominated by a second-best outcome
Proof
:
Suppose a is IICSE. By proposition 1, it is also PICSE. By proposition
3 it is feasible in the third best problem, so consumer utility cannot be
greater than the third best level at the given profits. Then the grand
coalition could move to the second best allocation, which is an IIC block.
Contradiction
.
Discussion
Roughly speaking, the equilibrium in the third-best case works as
follows: firm 1 offers the third-best contract, while all other firms offer
the set T of safe trades. The consumer accepts the third-best trade from firm
1, doesn't request any trade from other firms, and chooses the third-best
effort
.
It can happen that the firm offering the third-best: rrontra.C .:~— I.
receives positive profits; nonetheless the identical competing firms are
unable co undercut the offer. This is because any competing firm knows that
additional offers will push the consumer to a point where he prefers to alter
his level of effort. Thus in any equilibrium, the active firm has a first
mover advantage
.
Since each firm is identical, the equilibrium chooses which firms get to
offer how much of the third best contract, and in different equilibria
different firms receive different payoffs. Given the total distribution of
others' assignments, there is no other assignment that any insurer prefers.
As the last theorem demonstrates, there is no strong equilibrium as long
as the third-best outcome does not lie on the second-best frontier. The
problem is that the coalition of the whole can block with a deviation which is
individually incentive compatible, namely a second-best outcome. Of course
this deviation is itself vulnerable to a deviation involving a coalitio of the
consumer and some firms, but such coalitional incentive constraints are not
imposed on the blocking deviations in an IICSE. Thus it is precisely the lack
of coalitional constraints on allowable deviations that precludes the
existence of SNE and IICSE, while their inclusion allows the existence of
PICSE.
VI . SUMMARY
We have examined an economic environment with moral hazard and the
possibility of unmonitored trading. We modeled the situation as a market game
and compared the equilibria under varying degrees of power to contract,
corresponding to varying degrees of observability of actions. Our main result
is that Pairwise INcentive Compatible Strong Equilibrium achieves the
constrained optimal allocation with the appropriate level :f
constraint. In the case of unmonitorable trading we proposed a p.ew -3::::.
th i rd best contract wnich maintains this relationship.
Of the three different information structures examined, it is structure
(b) , where individual trades and consumption levels can be publicly verified,
which most closely resembles the Prescott-Townsend formulation. The
alternative "market - failure" approach models the outcome of decentralized
markets with information structure (c)
,
in which individual trades cannot be
monitored. This suggests the following interpretation of the discrepancy
between the two approaches:
On the one hand, t he market failure approach involves an implicit
assumption that governments have access to better monitoring technology than
do private firms. Thus it is unsurprising that the market failure approach
concludes that governments have a role in remedying externalities arising from
moral hazard. None the les's , the assumption may be natural in some
circumstances: the power of a government to tax a trade implies the ability
of the government to monitor that trade. If governments are relatively
efficient at monitoring trades with third parties (e.g., because such
information has public good characteristics) then governments may in fact have
a natural corrective role.
On the other hand, the Prescott-Townsend approach implicitly assumes
extensive capability to monitor agents' trades. In the absence of moral
hazard agents do not need to monitor each other's trades in the corresponding
Arrow-Debreu competitive equilibrium; but in moral hazard settings, as we have
seen, such monitoring is crucial. The fact that the equilibrium we derive is
different from those proposed in previous analyses, and the fact that our
equilibrium does have some efficiency properties, do not erase the conclusion
that there is a welfare loss from the inability to monitor trades.
The similarity of the formalism of the Arrow-Debreu formulation In
situations witn and without moral hazard conceals the difference in importance
of monitoring in tne two settings. This suggests the need for caution in
choosing the appropriate notion of commodities and agents in the presence of
imperfect information. Indeed, one may wonder whether an allocation
mechanism such as used by Prescott-Townsend may legitimately be described as
decentralized, since it requires such extensive monitoring. If in fact we
view the degree of monitoring as a defining characteristic of the degree of
centralization of a resource allocation mechanism, our analysis demonstrates
the need for centralized mechanisms in the presence of moral hazard.
Our analysis also provides a critical perspective on the Coase (1960)
theorem, complementing the analyses recently presented by Chari and Jones
(1988) and Mailath and Postlewaite (1988). Their critiques are based on the
problems created by the presence of private information; we focus on the
instability of coalition formation. In the absence of sufficient monitoring
of side-trades, our analysis identifies a form of collusive free-riding by
subcoalitions as an impediment to efficiency- improving contracts.
Interestingly, the severity of this free-riding increases as the coalitions
grow in size and the number of possible deviating subcoalitions increases.
Thus the analysis provides a formal justification for models limiting
cooperation to small coalitions, and a potential insight into problems faced
in generating desirable cooperative outcomes for large coalitions in a wide
range of economic environments.
We believe this approach provides insight on the role of governments in
enhancing the efficiency of decentralized mechanisms. Do governments in fact
have a comparative advantage in monitoring private actions? If so, are taxes
the natural way to exploit this advantage in the public interest?
Alternatively, is there anything to choose between the role of governments in
monitoring private actions and enforcing contracts written between private-
parties, compared to more centralized allocation mechanisms involving
taxation? Ic will be worthwhile to extend the examination of monitoring to
contexts other than moral hazard in which "market failure" is claimed to
justify government intervention — for example, private monopoly or common
resource externalities.
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FOOTNOTES
This has a close relation with the notion of a Coalition Proof Nash
Equilibrium, proposed by Bernheim, Peleg and Whinston (1986); see also Kahn
Mookherjee (1991). It turns out that for the game in hand, the outcomes
generated by the two concepts coincide. Intuitively, this is because most
relevant deviations involve only pairs comprising one consumer and one firm.
For a formal analysis of the Coalition Proof Nash Equilibria of the game with
unobservable trades and effort, see Kahn and Mookherjee (1990).
2
In a sense, the choice of insurance as the application for our problem, while
dictated by the history of this literature, is unfortunate. In the formal
specification of the game in the previous section, we distinguish beteen
contracts and spot actions. In this application, spot trades are themselves
insurance policies. In cases where the ability to monitor is limited, we will
nonetheless assume that the consumer is able to collect payments from the
insurance company in the case of an accident and the insurance company is able
to collect payments from the consumer in the case of no accident. If this
strains the reader's imagination, he may prefer to consider x. and x~ as
concrete gooas wnich can be traded spot (on informal markets, for example)
'This framework has been considered by numerous authors, among them, Arnott
and Stiglitz [1982, 1987], Pauly [1974], Hellwig [1983], and in related
formulations, Helpman and Laffont [1975]. We will closely follow the basic
analytics set out by Arnott and Stiglitz [1982].
34
More generally, the planner will incorporate a minimum expected profit target
for each firm separately. It is straightforward to check that the more general
problem is equivalent to (i), since the former is solved by solving (i) as a
first step, and then distributing trades among firms to attain the profit
targets for each of them separately. We shall continue to use the same
aggregate formulation in the second and third-best scenarios as well, for the
same reason.
The reader may check that the indifference curve of the consumer (assuming
e=0) which passes through S has slope less than ( 1 -p(0) )/p(0) , which is the
slope of Z
n
.
6
See Pauly (1974)
.
A formal proof follows an argument analogous to one which will be used in
Section 5. Intuitively, any insurance firm i offering a side-trade to the
consumer has to worry not only about the effort chosen by the consumer in the
event of having consumption x+r . It has to consider the possibility that given
the additional trade r offered by i, the consumer may have an incentive to
enter into yet another side- trade r with a different insurance firm, and the
effort level e that is optimal for the consumer fiven consumDt lor1 ^x,i< ^ may
cause the provider of r to lose money A more detailed discussion of the
planning problem with unobservabie siae craaes is pursued in Kahn and
Mookherjee (1990b).
g
When more than one allocation solves this problem, we will restrict attention
to those maximizing firm profits V(x,e).
9
Note chat even chough the supplier of insurance is making positive profits,
the planner cannot increase the consumer's utility by redistributing
consumption in his favor; the resultant allocation would violate the
coalitional constraint (iii). That is, although the new insurance would give
the consumer higher utility, it would also cause him to want to purchase still
more insurance, which other firms would be willing to supply at prices which
are profitable irrespective of the consumer's effort. The additional insurance
would cause the consumer to switch his effort choice in a manner which would
make existing insurance providers lose money.
This structure is crucial to our model, because it allows agent i to offer
contracts which commit himself to trades conditional on agreements by other
agents comraiting themselves to "the other side of the bargain." Without this
quid pro quo feature, other parties could take advantage of unconditional
offers by agent i, while refusing to bind themselves. For example, in the
insurance setting with observable effort and trades (the first-best world) an
insurance firm offering a first-best contract could be exploited by an insured
individual who accepts the perfect insurance offered, while refusing to bind
himself to first-best levels of effort.
Despite the fact that the contracting game is a two-stage game
,
we do no:
impose any perfection requirements: Our formulation does not require action
choices to form an equilibrium in the trading game subsequent to
of f -equilibrium contract proposals. For the case which we are examining it
appears immaterial.
12
See Boyd- Prescott , Marimon, James Kahn , and Berliant.
13
See Kahn-Mookherj ee (1991) for more details.
7A
14
The equilibrium therefore requires that firms offer an infinite number of
alternative trades which the consumer does not accept. It captures the notion
of a world with free entry, where potential entrants stand ready to enter and
offer safe trades. The importance of such "threat contracts" is noted by
Arnott and Stiglitz (1987).
Andy Postlewaite has suggested an extension of our model where the consumer
visits different firms in sequence. Each firm would worry about the incentive
of the consumer to trade with firms he will subsequently visit, and
implications for the effort choice. In this setting there may be a unique
CPNE satisfying suitable perfection constraints, where the first firm that the
consumer visits obtains a first mover advantage.
See Myerson (1988) for a similar view in the context of adverse selection
economies
.
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